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Abstract
Although many airlines offer seats in multiple cabins (economy vs. premium classes)
with different service quality, previous work on airline revenue management has focused
on treating the cabins separately.
In this thesis, we develop several single-leg multiple cabin revenue management
optimization algorithms. We extend two different single-leg separate cabin dynamic
programming algorithms to the multiple cabin case, and also present three Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) based heuristics and a dynamic programming decom-
position heuristic. We then evaluate the revenue and passenger mix performance of the
different algorithms using the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS) which
simulates competitive markets with passenger choice of fare options and cabin. We first
test the methods in a simple single market network and then in a more realistic complex
network.
We find that multiple cabin methods do not lead to a systematic revenue increase.
Indeed, simulation results show that the performance of the different methods ranges
from a decrease of 9.6% to an increase of 2.4% in revenues. The discrepancies in
performance between the different methods are explained by the trade-off between rev-
enue gains from additional economy bookings and the losses from displaced premium
passengers. Further, we observe that successful methods lead to a revenue increase
by accepting additional bookings in top economy classes rather than in low economy
classes. Finally, the poor performance of the dynamic programming methods tested is
due to a misalignment between the underlying assumptions of the algorithms and the
reality of the booking and passenger choice process.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Aeronautics and Astronautics
Thesis Reader: Cynthia Barnhart
Title: Ford Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems,
Associate Dean, School of Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
IN an effort to maximize their profit, airlines have relied on quantitative approachesto assist their decision making process. In this thesis, we focus on the single-leg
multiple-cabin revenue management problem. More specifically, on a given flight-leg
providing non-stop service between an origin and a destination, airlines have to decide
at what fare they are willing to sell their seats by taking into account historical bookings,
time remaining until departure, and remaining capacity in the different cabins.
We define the single-leg multiple cabin revenue management problem, present rel-
evant previous work, describe multiple algorithms that we developed, and test these
algorithms in a realistic simulation environment. Our contribution is to extend existing
separate cabin algorithms to the multiple cabin problem and highlight the different
trade-offs that need to be taken into account when solving the multiple cabin revenue
management problem in a competitive passenger choice environment.
In this chapter, we provide some background and explain the motivations behind
our work. We review relevant airline revenue management concepts, define the single-
leg multiple-cabin revenue management problem, explicitly state the contribution of
our work, and present the structure of this thesis.
 1.1 Airline revenue management concepts
In this section, we provide some background relevant to the multiple cabin revenue
management problem. More specifically, we review the concept of differential pricing
and define the logic behind revenue management.
 1.1.1 Differential pricing
Following US airline industry deregulation in 1978, airlines were allowed more flexibility
in pricing and route choice. In an effort to increase revenues, airlines extended the
13
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
practice of selling seats at different fares by implementing multiple fare classes. As
a result, two identical seats can be sold at different fares in a strategy referred to
as “differential pricing.” Consequently, airlines charge higher fares and extract more
revenues from consumers with high willingness-to-pay (WTP) while accepting low fare
bookings requests from low-WTP passengers. For the airlines, the advantage is that
they can capture a higher proportion of consumers’ WTP and increase their revenues.
Passengers also gain from this strategy because more passengers can afford to buy
tickets and airlines, motivated by increased revenue opportunities, offer more traveling
options.
Figure 1.1. Potential revenue with a single fare (A) and multiple fares (differential pricing) (B)
Figure 1.1 shows a typical demand curve and potential revenues for two different
pricing strategies. In Figure 1.1(A), the airline offers a single fare. In this strategy,
passengers with a WTP lower than the offered fare cannot afford to buy a ticket; all
passengers that have a WTP greater than or equal to the offered fare buy tickets at this
single offered fare. As illustrated by the shaded area under the curve in Figure 1.1(A),
the potential revenue for this strategy is the product of the fare and the number of
passengers with WTP greater than or equal to the offered fare. The second strategy,
differential pricing, which is presented in Figure 1.1(B) is to offer multiple fares. Here,
more people are able to buy tickets than with the first strategy because the lowest fare
offered is lower than the single fare offered in the first strategy. The potential revenue
of differential pricing is represented by the shaded area under the curve in Figure 1.1(B)
and, as one can see, is greater than the potential revenue for the single fare strategy.
This theory assumes that each and every passenger is forced to buy the highest fare
available that is less than or equal to their WTP. For obvious reasons, there is no way
airlines can know somebody’s WTP and, even if they were able, they could not force
Sec. 1.1. Airline revenue management concepts 15
Table 1.1. Example of a fare structure
Cabin Class Fare Adv. Purchase Min. Stay Change fee Cancel fee
Premium
F $1000 0 No No No
P $850 7 No No $ 150
Economy
Y $700 0 No No No
M $500 5 No No $150
B $300 14 No $ 100 $ 150
Q $150 21 Sat. Stay $ 200 $ 150
people to buy a specific fare. That said, there exists a strategy airlines use to prevent
high-WTP passengers from buying cheaper fares; airlines add different restrictions on
low fare classes that make these low fare classes unattractive to high-WTP passengers.
Table 1.1 shows an example of a differentiated fare structure for two different types
of seats. In this example the airline offers seats in two different cabins, premium and
economy, each at multiple price points. Note that differential pricing is applied within
each cabin. Following industry practice, a letter designates the booking class in which
tickets are sold. It is generally assumed that high-WTP passengers make their travel
decisions later in the booking process than low-WTP passengers, that they spend a
relatively short period of time at their destination, and that they are likely to change
their travel plans at some point in the booking process. In this example, the airline
uses four types of restrictions:
1. Advance Purchase
Advance purchase requires passengers to purchase x days before departure. For
example, Class B can be bought up to 14 days before departure.
2. Minimum stay (at destination)
Minimum stay restrictions requires passengers to stay at the destination for a
minimum time. For example, Class Q can be bought by passengers staying over a
Saturday night at their destination.
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3. Change fee
Change fee restrictions requires passengers to pay a nominal fee for any change to
the reservation. For example, changing a Class B ticket for a different Class or a
different departure time costs $100.
4. Cancel fee
Cancel fee restrictions requires passengers to pay a nominal fee upon cancellation
of the booking. For example, Canceling a ticket in classes P, M, B, and Q costs
$150.
These are examples of restrictions in the industry, but other restrictions can also
be applied on the different fare products (e.g. Round-trip requirement, etc.). We refer
interested readers in a complete discussion of differentiated fare structures to Botimer’s
PhD thesis [7] on pricing and fare structure differentiation.
 1.1.2 Revenue management
Because airlines use differential pricing and because capacity is limited, airlines have
to decide the number of seats to allocate to each fare class. In fact, instead of allo-
cating seats to a specific class, airlines define nested booking limits for each fare class.
Figure 1.2 shows nested booking limits for four different classes going from the most
valuable Y-class to the least valuable Q-class. As we can see, nested booking limits are
such that as long as there are still seats available, airlines never reject booking requests
in the highest booking class.
The advantage of differential pricing is that it increases the potential revenue that
airlines can capture, while the inconvenience of differential pricing is that it forces air-
lines to decide whether to accept or reject each booking request. In the airline context,
we define revenue management as the science of maximizing revenues by determining
the number of seats available at each fare class.
Figure 1.3 shows the different operational decisions that an airline has to make
from a long term horizon until the day of departure. At the strategic level, airlines
decide what kind of aircraft they buy and which route they serve. At the tactical level,
airlines can affect their revenues by choosing their pricing strategy, by applying revenue
management. Revenue management occurs after the decisions regarding fleet planning,
scheduling, and pricing have occurred. Revenue management is the last opportunity
for the airline to maximize its profit through revenue maximization. Since the airline
Figure 1.2. Nested booking limits [1]
Figure 1.3. Airline operation planning process [5]
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has already committed to fly on a given route and that the marginal cost of a passenger
(i.e. a meal and incremental fuel) is negligible, we can assume cost to be fixed at the
time of the booking request which makes revenue maximization equivalent to profit
maximization.
 1.2 Problem definition
In this section, we describe the problem on which this thesis focuses. The objective is
to better understand the characteristics of the single-leg multiple cabin revenue man-
agement problem as it is faced by the airlines in today’s air transportation industry.
We first explain the difference between separate and multiple cabin revenue man-
agement problems, describe how people make their traveling decision, and illustrate
how airlines make their revenue management decision.
 1.2.1 Separate vs multiple cabin
It is important to understand the difference between separate and multiple cabin revenue
management problems. In the separate cabin revenue management problem, passengers
with bookings in a given cabin are only allowed to use seats in their respective cabin.
However, in the multiple cabin revenue management problem, passengers with bookings
in the economy cabin can be upgraded to a premium cabin seat while premium bookings
are always using premium capacity. It is assumed that economy passengers always
accept an upgrade to a higher quality premium seat.
Here, we focus on upgrades caused by the airline’s effort to better use its capacity
and we are not taking any other types of upgrades into account. For example, we are
not interested in upgrades due to frequent-flyer programs or credit card deals. Stated
otherwise, we are only interested in cases for which the demand is such that a given
flight would depart with empty seats in the premium cabin, while some passengers are
rejected because the economy cabin is full. In these cases, allowing additional economy
bookings to use available premium capacity can potentially increase revenue.
Although both separate and multiple cabin revenue management problems compare
the immediate benefit of a booking with the decrease in future expected revenue caused
by the reduction in capacity, the multiple cabin revenue management problem is more
complex because the airline has to take into account the trade-off between economy and
business cabin bookings.
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 1.2.2 Passenger decision process
Figure 1.4 shows a schematic representation of the different options available for a pas-
senger that wants to travel from the origin “O” to the destination “D”. Because the
origin lies within the catchment area of two different airports, the passenger chooses
between these two different departure airports to initiate his trip and chooses between
the multiple itinerary options available at each airport. We make the distinction be-
tween passenger itineraries and flight-legs. A passenger itinerary is defined as any set
of flights allowing the passenger to go from his or her preferred origin to his or her
desired destination. A flight-leg is the unit of operation of an airline, and passengers
fly on multiple flight-legs to complete their itineraries. Therefore, a single flight-leg
provides service to passengers going from different origins to different destinations. In
Figure 1.4, flight-legs are represented by full arrows between any pair of airport and an
itinerary would be any set of flight-leg that links the departure airport to the arrival
airport.
A1 
A2 
A3 
Ground transportation 
Air transportation 
O 
D A4 
A1 Airport 
Airport catchment area 
X Origin/Destination 
Figure 1.4. Passenger itinerary choice
At the time of booking, passengers also have a preferred time window in which they
would like to travel. Passengers have schedule restrictions such that they cannot leave
the origin before a given time and they have to be at the destination before a given
time. Passengers also have finite financial resources and there exist a threshold value
for the fare above which they will decide not to travel. Finally, passengers have different
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product preferences. For example, they might be interested in booking a refundable
ticket in order to keep flexibility in their travel plans. Given all these characteristics,
passengers choose the traveling option that maximizes their utility.
 1.2.3 Airline decision process
Airlines apply revenue management principles based on their assumptions about pas-
senger behavior and on available historical booking data. Figure 1.5 shows the different
data sources and models used in the airlines decision process. In this thesis, we focus
on the “optimization model” part of the process.
Figure 1.5. Airline information structure
The objective of the airline decision process is to define a decision rule allowing the
airline to decide whether to accept or reject incoming booking requests. We explain two
different decision rules. First, airlines can use nested booking limits as a decision rule
and accept booking requests in a given class as long as the nested booking limit for this
class is greater than zero. Second, airlines can use bidprices which are defined as the
lowest fare at which the airline is willing to sell its capacity. Airlines accept booking
requests in classes for which the fare is greater than or equal to the bidprice. Regardless
of the specifics of the airline’s selected decision rule, three pieces of information are
needed.
Sec. 1.2. Problem definition 21
1. Average class fares
In order to make the right decision regarding a booking request, airlines have to
know what is the expected financial benefit from this booking and what is the
expected revenue from other bookings. Using historical revenue data, airlines can
obtain the average fare for a class on a given flight-leg. Since a flight-leg is flown
by passengers on different itineraries and fares are different between itineraries,
there does not exist a single fare for a given class on a flight-leg and airlines need
to find an average fare for each class.
For example, airlines can allocate the fare of a single passenger to the different
flight-legs on his or her itinerary based on the fraction of the total itinerary flying
distance traveled on each flight-legs. Averaging these value will give the airline an
array of fares, one for each class for each flight-leg.
2. Expected number of bookings to come
Using historical booking data for similar flight-legs and actual bookings at hand,
airlines are able to forecast bookings to come by class. Airlines use this forecast
to compute the number of seats to protect for high fare class bookings against low
fare class bookings.
3. Number of available units
Finally, using “no-show” data and the expected number of bookings to come,
airlines can decide how many units they make available. It is important to note
that the number of available units might be greater than the total number of seats
on the plane. Indeed, it is known that some passengers will not show up at the
time of departure. Therefore, airlines allow for more bookings than they have seats
available in a process called overbooking. However, in this thesis, overbooking is
not taken into consideration and, for the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the
number of remaining units as the number of remaining seats.
These different sources of information are used to find nested booking limits or
bidprices. As stated earlier, these are used together with airline analysts’ business
knowledge to decide whether to accept or reject booking requests in each classes.
Re-optimization
Since airlines operate a large number of flight-legs in a complex network, it is com-
putationally impossible to continuously optimize to obtain the latest nested booking
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limits or the latest bidprices. Consequently, airlines divide the booking horizon in a
manageable number of time frames and update the decision rule values once per time
frame.
 1.3 Contribution
The contribution of this work is two-fold. First, we develop different heuristics and
extend existing separate cabin revenue management optimization methods to solve the
multiple cabin problem. Second, we test these methods in a realistic simulation environ-
ment and provide insights on the behavior of the different methods in an environment
with realistic passenger choice and competing airlines. More specifically,
• we extend the existing separate cabin dynamic programming formulation by Laut-
enbacher and Stidham [16] to develop a dynamic programming formulation for the
multiple cabin revenue management problem,
• we extend a separate cabin realistic variance approach by Walczak [17] to the
multiple cabin revenue management problem,
• we develop four heuristic methods based on the dynamic programming formulation
and on the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) heuristic [2],
• we evaluate the performance of the different methods in a simulation environment
with realistic passenger choice behavior, and we find that multiple cabin optimiza-
tion is not systematically leading to a revenue increase.
 1.4 Structure of the thesis
First, in Chapter 2 we discuss in detail relevant literature on the revenue management
optimization problem and more specifically on the multiple cabin optimization problem.
In Chapter 3, we present the different algorithms that on which we focus in this thesis
and their underlying assumptions. In Chapter 4, we present the Passenger Origin-
destination Simulator (PODS), a realistic passenger choice simulation tool, and we will
compare the revenue performance of the different methods in two different competitive
environments: first, in a single market competitive environment and, second, in a more
realistic network scenario with four airlines competing in multiple markets. Finally, in
Chapter 5, we will discuss the different findings and propose future areas for research.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
IN this chapter, we review relevant previous work on the multiple cabin revenue man-agement problem. More specifically, we first look at existing work on the separate
cabin revenue management problem. We review a dynamic programming formulation,
an extension to this dynamic programming algorithm that allows for higher demand
variance, and a static heuristic widely used in the industry. We then briefly review
existing work on the multiple cabin revenue management problem. Finally, we review
a capacity control mechanism for multiple cabin environments, shared nesting, which
allows airlines to keep track of the remaining capacity throughout the booking process
and prevents overselling.
 2.1 Separate cabin revenue management problem
In this section, we review existing work on the single-leg separate cabin revenue manage-
ment problem. We present a dynamic programming formulation, an extension to this
dynamic programming formulation that allows for higher variance, and the Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) static heuristic.
 2.1.1 Lautenbacher-Stidham dynamic programming
In their 1999 paper, Lautenbacher and Stidham [16] develop a dynamic programming
model for the single leg multiple fare class revenue management problem. Their model
divides the booking horizon into time slices for which the probability of observing more
than one booking during any one time slice is negligible. At any time slice, the airline
decides whether to accept or reject the requested fare. They assume that bookings in a
given class i in the set of classes F follow a Poisson process with known rate λit at time
frame t. They then approximate the booking arrival process with a Bernoulli process
with pit =
λit
Nt
as the probability of observing a booking during one of the Nt time slices
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of time frame t. The probability of observing no bookings is given by p0t = 1−
∑
i∈F p
i
t.
More formally, the dynamic program is
Un(x, ri) = max{ri + Ej(Un−1(x− 1, j)),Ej(Un−1(x, j))}, if ri > 0
Un(x, 0) = Ej(Un−1(x, j)), if ri = 0
where Un(x, ri) is the expected future revenue at time slice n with x seats remaining
when observing a booking request of ri, and Ej is the expected value over the different
fares offered. Or equivalently,
Un(x) =
∑
i∈F
pin ·max{ri + Un−1(x− 1), Un−1(x)}+ p0nUn−1(x), ∀x ≥ 1;∀n ≥ 1
with U0(x) = Un(0) = 0, ∀x and ∀n. In this equation, x is the number of remaining
seats, Un(x) is the expected revenue at time slice n with x seats remaining and ri is the
fare for Class i, and F is the set of fare classes. Airlines compute expected revenues at
each time slice for all possible values of x.
As defined previously, a bidprice is the lowest price at which an airline is willing
to sell a given seat. Airlines will use bidprices to make their decision regarding a
booking request. If the requested fare is higher than the bidprice, the booking request
is accepted, and it is rejected otherwise. Bidprice at a given time slice n for a given
capacity x (BPn(x)) can be computed using expected revenue computed previously in
the following equation:
BPn(x) = Un−1(x)− Un−1(x− 1).
We now discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the approach proposed by Laut-
enbacher and Stidham. Their dynamic programming formulation suits the structure of
the revenue management problem because it acknowledges the fact that bookings are
interspersed among different fare classes over multiple time frames in the booking pro-
cess. Howerver, since it assumes booking requests arrive according to a Poisson process,
the variance of the number of booking requests in Class i at time frame t, var(Bit), is
equal to the mean number of bookings in Class i at time frame t, E[Bit]:
E[Bit] = var(B
i
t) = λ
i
t.
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However, we know from observation in the airline industry that the variance-to-
mean ratio for the number of bookings is frequently greater than 1. Consequently,
some information about the underlying demand distribution and more specifically the
variance in the number of booking requests is not used when applying the Lautenbacher-
Stidham approach despite the fact that the airline can estimate the variance of the
number of booking requests to come.
As shown by Diwan [11] in his Master’s thesis, since the Lautenbacher-Stidham
algorithm underestimates the variance, it is overly confident about future high-WTP
demand and leads to bidprices that are excessively high. Bidprices that are too high
lead to a decrease in revenues because the airline rejects a greater proportion of low
fare classes booking requests early in the process while high fare demand predicted by
the Poisson process does not materialize later in the booking process.
Finally, computational time can also be an issue with this formulation. As we
saw, the Lautenbacher-Stidham formulation requires one calculation for each possible
capacity level per time slice. The number of calculations required is so large that the
Lautenbacher-Stidham approach is not commonly used in practice. This drawback
motivates the need for heuristics that find reasonable sub-optimal solutions in a less
computationally intensive way.
 2.1.2 Higher demand variance in dynamic programming
In order to address the variance issue raised for the Lautenbacher-Stidham algorithm,
Walczak [17] proposes to allow for higher variances by assuming batched booking ar-
rivals. The idea is to allow bookings to arrive in batches of size bit at a rate of rate λ¯
i
t
such that
bit =
⌊
var(Bit)
E[Bit]
⌉
λ¯it =
λit
bit
.
By setting bit equal to the variance-to-mean ratio, we keep the expected number of
bookings E[B¯it] equal to E[B
i
t] and increase the variance so that V ar[B¯
i
t] is b
i
t times
greater than V ar[Bit] where B¯
i
t is the number of Class i booking requests observed
during time frame t. We have
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E[B¯it] = λ¯
i
t · bit
=
λit · bit
bit
= λit
and,
V ar[B¯it] = V ar[b
i
t ·Ait]
=
(
bit
)2 · V ar[Ait]
=
(
bit
)2 · λ¯it
= bit · λit
= bit · V ar[Bit]
where Ait is the number or Class i booking request batches at time frame t. The dynamic
program becomes
Un(x) =
∑
i∈F
p¯in · max
j={1,...,min{bit,x}}
{j ∗ ri + Un−1(x− j), Un−1(x)}+ p¯0nUn−1(x)
where U(x), i, F , bit, x, and ri are defined as previously, j is the number of bookings
from the batch that will be accepted, and p¯in is the probability of observing a booking
batch arrival in Class i at time n such that:
p¯in =
λ¯it
Nt
.
Walczak’s approach is flexible and addresses one of the criticisms of the Lautenbacher-
Stidham formulation. Indeed, the Walczak approach allows for higher variances in the
booking arrival process and does not assume equal variance for the different fare classes.
That said, computation time is still a major concern with the Walczak approach which
reinforces the need for less computationally intensive heuristics.
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 2.1.3 Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR)
In his doctoral thesis, Belobaba [2] develops the original version of a the Expected
Marginal Seat Revenue static heuristic (EMSRa) to define nested booking limits assum-
ing independent and normally distributed demands for the different classes. Belobaba
[3] then further refined the heuristic and presented EMSRb, an improved and more
robust version of EMSR. In this thesis, we focus solely on the EMSRb approach.
At a given time and with given demand distribution, the booking limit for the top
class (Class 1) is equal to the remaining capacity and the booking limit for subsequent
classes is given by
BLni = BL
n
1 −
[
µn1,...,i−1 + σ
n
1,...,i−1 · Φ−1
(
1− r
n
i
r1,...,i−1
)]
.
Where BLni is the booking limit for Class i at time n, µ
n
1,...,i−1 is the joint mean
demand to come for classes 1 to i−1, σn1,...,i−1 is the joint standard deviation of demand
for classes 1 to i− 1 and rn1,...,i−1 is the weighted average fare for classes 1 to i− 1. We
have
µn1,...,i−1 =
i−1∑
j=1
µnj(
σn1,...,i−1
)2
=
(
σn1,...,i−2
)2
+
(
σni−1
)2
rn1,...,i−1 =
∑i−1
j=1 r
n
j · µnj
µn1,...,i−1
The EMSR heuristic is widely used in the industry and empirical results show that
it performs well in practice [3]. We can also use EMSR to obtain an approximation
of the expected marginal revenue of each seat at a given time which can be used as
a bidprice. Once the airline finds the expected marginal revenue for a given seat, it
can then compare it with a booking request and decide whether to accept or reject it.
Define the expected marginal revenue from each seat x at time n as EMSRn(x). We
have
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EMSRn(x) = max
i∈F
[
min
(
rni , r
n
1,...,i ·
(
1− Φ
(
x− µn1,...,i
σn1,...,i
)))]
Although EMSR is a static heuristic, it is possible to recalculate the EMSRn(x)
value multiple times throughout the booking process, i.e. at each time frame. This
implementation is quite common in practice and we will use it as a baseline scenario
when comparing the different algorithms.
The main advantage of the EMSRb heuristic is that the computation time required is
significantly smaller than the computation time required for the Lautenbacher-Stidham
and Walczak approaches.
 2.2 Multiple cabin revenue management problem
In this section, we briefly review existing work on the multiple cabin revenue manage-
ment problem. We first look at two papers dealing with multiple products, each offered
at a single price point, and then look at a capacity sharing mechanism, shared nesting,
used to manage remaining availability.
 2.2.1 Multiple product upgrades
We identify three papers as relevant to our work. First, in their 2009 paper, Shumsky
and Zhang [13], provide the optimal dynamic programming solution to the multiperiod
capacity allocation. Second, in their working paper, Gallego and Stefanescu [12] in-
troduce two dynamic programming formulations for the revenue management problem
with upgrades. Their formulations differ by the time at which the upgrade decision has
to be made.
In our terms, they focus on the multiple cabin revenue management problem with
a single class in each cabin. They were able to show that using upgrades helps airlines
in balancing supply and demand by using excess premium cabin capacity for economy
cabin demand. They were also able to show that “fairness” is easy to ensure and does
not affect the optimality of the solution. An upgrade mechanism is considered fair if
the upgrade priority goes to the passengers who bought higher-end products. In the
airline context, this means that a passenger booked in a fully unrestricted and more
expensive economy class will be upgraded to the premium cabin before any passenger
that booked in a cheaper economy class.
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Lastly, the paper by Steinhardt and Go¨ensch [15] is closely related to the work
presented in this thesis. They address the upgrade and the capacity control problems
simultaneously in the revenue management context. They introduce a decomposition
heuristic using deterministic linear programming, and develop a dynamic programming
algorithm that solves the upgrade and capacity control problems simultaneously.
 2.2.2 Shared nesting
In his 2010 AGIFORS presentation, Walczak [18] introduces an availability control
mechanism for multiple cabin optimization. We refer to this control mechanism as
shared nesting. If we assume that, for a given flight, a premium cabin capacity of
CAPP , an economy cabin capacity of CAPE , the number of seats available, AV LP
and AV LE for classes in the premium and in the economy cabin respectively, the
number of accepted bookings, BKGP and BKGE for the premium and economy cabins
respectively, and the number of premium cabin seats available for economy booking
upgrades UPG which is assumed to be given at this stage, and to be less than or equal
to AV LP . Shared nesting works as follows:
if BKGE < CAPE ,
AV LP = CAPP −BKGP
UPGa = min(UPG,CAPP −BKGP )
AV LE = CAPE + UPGa −BKGE
if BKGE ≥ CAPE ,
AV LP = CAPP −BKGP − (BKGE − CAPE)
UPGa = min(UPG,CAPP −BKGP )
AV LE = CAPE + UPGa −BKGE
This approach assures that the airline is not overselling its capacity.
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 2.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we reviewed relevant literature on the separate cabin revenue manage-
ment problem. We reviewed dynamic programming approaches and a static heuristic.
We also identified relevant existing work on the multiple cabin revenue management
problem and reviewed shared nesting, a useful capacity control mechanism. In the next
chapter, we will present the different multiple cabin optimization methods we developed
in collaboration with MIT PODS consortium airline members.
Chapter 3
Dynamic Formulations and
Heuristics
IN this chapter, we present the different algorithms we developed in collaboration withthe MIT PODS consortium airline members and on which we focus in this thesis. We
first present an extension of the Lautenbacher-Stidham separate cabin model and then
present different EMSR-based heuristics and a dynamic programming decomposition
heuristic that can be used to solve the multiple cabin problem.
 3.1 Multiple cabin dynamic programming (DP) formulations
In this section, we present two different dynamic programming algorithms for the mul-
tiple cabin problem. They are extensions of Lautenbacher-Stidham and Walczak’s al-
gorithms for the separate cabin revenue management problem presented in Chapter 2.
 3.1.1 Multiple cabin DP
We first propose a multiple cabin dynamic programming algorithm which we refer to as
“Multiple cabin DP”. Similar to the separate cabin Lautenbacher-Stidham formulation,
it assumes a single flight with multiple fare classes and known independent demands.
It also assumes that booking requests arrive following a Poisson process. We have the
following equations:
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Un(xp, xe) =
∑
i∈Fp
pin ·max{ri + Un−1(xp − 1, xe), Un−1(xp, xe)}
+
∑
j∈Fe
pin ·max{ri + Un−1(xp − 1, xe), ri + Un−1(xp, xe − 1), Un−1(xp, xe)}
+p0nUn−1(xp, xe),∀x ≥ 1;∀n ≥ 1
with U0(xp, xe) = Un(0, 0) = 0, ∀x and ∀n. In this equation, xp and xe are the number
of remaining seats in the premium and economy cabin respectively, Un(xp, xe) is the
expected revenue at time slice n with xp and xe seats remaining in each cabin, ri is the
fare for Class i, Fp and Fe are the sets of premium and economy classes, respectively,
and pin is the probability of observing a booking in Class i during time slot n.
As in the separate cabin case, airlines compare requested fares with bidprices. The
difference here is that the airline compute a different bidprice for each cabin and compare
the requested fare to the appropriate bidprice. Specifically, premium booking requests
can be compared with the premium cabin bidprice and economy booking requests are
compared with both premium and economy bidprices. A given economy booking request
is first compared to the economy cabin bidprice, if it is greater than the economy
bidprice, the booking request is accepted in the economy cabin. Otherwise, the booking
request is compared to the premium cabin bidprice, if it is greater than the premium
bidprice, it is accepted and upgraded to the premium cabin. Otherwise, the booking
request is rejected. Bidprices are computed using the following formulas:
BPPn (xp, xe) = Un−1(xp, xe)− Un−1(xp − 1, xe)
BPEn (xp, xe) = Un−1(xp, xe)− Un−1(xp, xe − 1)
where BPPn (xp, xe) and BP
E
n (xp, xe) are bidprices for premium and economy cabins
respectively at time slice n with xp seats remaining in the premium cabin and xe seats
remaining in the economy cabin. As in the separate cabin case presented in Chapter 2,
there is a mismatch between the assumed variance of the “Multiple cabin DP” algorithm
and the observed variance. Indeed, the formulation presented above assumes that the
variance-to-mean ratio for demand to come in each class is equal to 1, and observations
from airline data show that this ratio is generally higher than 1.
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 3.1.2 Multiple Cabin DP with Variance
Based on the Walczak modification to the separate cabin Lautenbacher-Stidham algo-
rithm, the “Multiple cabin DP with Variance” algorithm allows different variance levels
for demand to come in each class. The formulation is very similar to the “Multiple
cabin DP” algorithm, but it assumes higher variance-to-mean ratios by allowing book-
ing requests in the different classes to arrive in batches. Following Walczak’s approach,
bookings arrive in batches of size bit with a rate λ¯
i
t such that
bit =
⌊
var(Bit)
E[Bit]
⌉
λ¯it =
λit
bit
Where λit is the arrival rate of booking requests in Class i at time t and B
i
t is a
random variable for the number of bookings observed in Class i at time t. Setting bit
equal to the variance-to-mean ratio for Class i at time frame t ensures that the expected
number of booking requests stays the same while the assumed variance for bookings to
come increases to the desired level. The dynamic program is
Un(xp, xe) =
∑
i∈Fp
p¯in max
j∈{1,...,min{bit,xp}}
[j · ri + Un−1(xp − j, xe), Un−1(xp, xe)] +
∑
i∈Fe
p¯in max
j∈{1,...,min{bit,xp+xe}}
[
j · ri + max
k∈{max(0,j−xe),min(xp,j)}
(Un−1(xp − k, xe − j + k)) ,
Un−1(xp, xe)]
+p¯0nUn−1(xp, xe),∀x ≥ 1.∀n ≥ 1.
With U0(xp, xe) = Un(0, 0) = 0, ∀x and ∀n. As in the “Multiple cabin DP” for-
mulation, xp and xe are the number of remaining seats in the premium and economy
cabin respectively, Un(xp, xe) is the expected revenue at time slot n with xp and xn
seats remaining in each cabin, ri is the fare for Class i, Fp and Fe are the sets of pre-
mium and economy classes respectively, p¯in is the probability of observing a batch of
bit Class i bookings at time slice n within time frame t, j is the number of bookings
requests accepted, and k is the number of economy bookings using premium capacity.
The decision rule is the same as in the “Multiple cabin DP”.
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 3.2 Heuristics
In this section, we review different heuristics that we developed to solve the multiple
cabin revenue management problem with the help of the MIT PODS consortium air-
line members. We first cover two different EMSR-based heuristic which we refer to
as “Shared nesting with EMSR” and “Shared nesting EMSRc bidprice control”, and
then present a dynamic programming decomposition which we call “Multiple cabin DP
heuristic.”
 3.2.1 Shared nesting with EMSR
In Chapter 2, we presented shared nesting, which is a control mechanism that keeps
track of the number of seats remaining when an airline is using multiple cabin optimiza-
tion. Suppose that, for a given flight, we have a premium cabin capacity of CAPP , an
economy cabin capacity of CAPE , the number of seats available, AV LP and AV LE for
classes in the premium and in the economy cabin respectively, the number of accepted
bookings, BKGP and BKGE for the premium and economy cabins respectively, and
the number of premium cabin seats available for economy booking upgrades UPG which
is assumed to be given at this stage, and to be less than or equal to AV LP . Shared
nesting works as follows:
if BKGE < CAPE ,
AV LP = CAPP −BKGP
UPGa = min(UPG,CAPP −BKGP )
AV LE = CAPE + UPGa −BKGE
if BKGE ≥ CAPE ,
AV LP = CAPP −BKGP − (BKGE − CAPE)
UPGa = min(UPG,CAPP −BKGP )
AV LE = CAPE + UPGa −BKGE
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Table 3.1. Calculation example for “Shared nesting Full EMSR”
Cabin Class Avg. fare Demand Std. dev. Protection Total BL Mod. BL
Premium
F $ 800 10 4 7 150 20
U $ 600 12 8 12 143 13
Economy
Y $600 13 7 32 138 138
M $ 400 15 9 46 118 118
B $ 350 22 10 77 104 104
L $ 200 27 9 107 73 73
Z $ 149 34 13 147 43 43
Q $ 99 42 11 - 3 3
One can think of the shared nesting as a two-step approach. The airline defines the
number of premium seats it is willing to share with economy passengers in one step
and the airline applies the standard EMSR approach in each cabin in a second step.
Both steps are done independently and can be done in any order, as we will see in the
following section. We developed three different ways of applying shared nesting with
EMSR.
Shared nesting full EMSR
The “Shared nesting full EMSR” approach applies the EMSRb algorithm to the entire
capacity and then modifies the booking limit for premium classes.
For example, we have a flight with 20 seats in the premium cabin and 130 seats in the
economy cabin. Table 3.1 shows, for each class in the different cabins, the average fare,
the mean expected demand, the standard deviation associated with this demand, the
protection level computed using the EMSR approach, total booking limits that would
be applied if the entire capacity was treated as a separate cabin, and modified booking
limits for the “Shared nesting full EMSR” approach. We can see that the difference
between total booking limits and modified booking limits is only observed in premium
classes. Indeed, we obtain the “Shared Nesting Full EMSR” premium classes’ booking
limit by subtracting the remaining economy cabin capacity to the total booking limits.
This method is very simple to implement for airlines already using the EMSR heuris-
tic. On the other hand, an important drawback of this method is that is assumes
premium demand uses economy capacity when calculating the booking limits. Indeed,
the EMSR heuristic protects seats for top classes against lower classes. Therefore, by
not changing the joint protect calculation, “Shared nesting Full EMSR” is making an
invalid assumption about capacity utilization.
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Table 3.2. Calculation example for “Shared nesting Economy EMSR”
Cabin Class Avg. fare Mean demand Std. dev. Protection Modified BL
Premium
F $ 800 10 4 7 20
U $ 600 12 8 12 13
Economy
Y $600 13 7 10 138
M $ 400 15 9 22 128
B $ 350 22 10 51 116
L $ 200 27 9 80 87
Z $ 149 34 13 120 58
Q $ 99 42 11 - 18
Shared nesting economy EMSR
“Shared nesting Economy EMSR” is very similar to “Shared nesting Full EMSR”, but
it fixes the capacity utilization issue identified above. We will look at the same example
and apply “Shared nesting Economy EMSR” to compare the booking limits between
the two methods.
In “Shared Nesting Economy EMSR”, we first apply the EMSRb algorithm to the
premium cabin and define the number of seats that must be protected against the
highest economy class. In our example, it is determined that 12 seats have to be
protected. Therefore, 8 seats can be shared with the economy classes. The second step
is to apply the EMSRb algorithm to the economy classes and to find the booking limits
using the total economy capacity plus the number of seats shared. We can see that the
modified booking limit in premium classes with “Shared Nesting Economy EMSR” are
identical the the ones obtained with “Shared Nesting Full EMSR.”
The difference between “Shared nesting full EMSR” and “Shared nesting economy
EMSR” is at the economy class booking limit level. More precisely, we can see by
comparing tables 3.1 and 3.2, that the booking limits for classes M, B, L, Z, and Q are
higher with “Shared nesting economy EMSR” when compared to “Shared nesting full
EMSR.” This is due to two factors: first, the EMSR heuristic protects seats for top
classes against lower classes, and second, in “Shared nesting full EMSR” the EMSRb
heuristic is applied on the entire set of classes while it is applied independently within
each cabin in “Shared nesting economy EMSR.” Because premium classes are not taken
into consideration when calculating economy classes’ booking limit in “Shared nesting
economy EMSR”, there are fewer valuable classes for which to protect seats against
cheaper classes.
Sec. 3.2. Heuristics 37
Shared nesting EMSRc bidprice control
In “Shared nesting EMSRc bidprice control” algorithm we first define the number of
seats to be shared and then apply the EMSRb algorithm within each cabin. As booking
requests come, capacity is then managed using the shared nesting control mechanism.
Figure 3.1. Cabin EMSR values
The idea is to use the EMSRb algorithm to find cabin bidprices. We set each cabin
bidprice to be equal to the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue of the last seat available
in each cabin using the following equation:
EMSRhn(x) = max
i∈Fh
[
min
(
rni , r
n
j,...,i ·
(
1− Φ
(
x− µnj,...,i
σnj,...,i
)))]
where EMSRhn(x) is the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue of the x
th seat in cabin h
at time n, F h is the set of classes in cabin h, rni is the fare for class i at time n, r
n
j,...,i
is the weighted average fare with respect to expected demand for classes j to i with j
being the highest Class in cabin h, Φ(·) is the normal distribution, µnj,...,i is the total
expected demand for classes j to i at time n, and σnj,...,i is the standard deviation for
the total expected demand for classes j to i at time n. We share the largest number
of premium seats for which the economy cabin bidprice is greater than or equal to the
premium cabin bidprice. Figure 3.1 shows a visual representation of the calculation of
the number of seats to share. We then apply the EMSRb algorithm in both cabins as
we did in the Shared Nesting Economy EMSR case.
Taking the same example as in tables 3.1 and 3.2, we compute the value for different
capacities in each cabin and the results are shown in Table 3.3.
We first look at the hypothetical case where, at this specific time, there are 20
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Table 3.3. Expected Marginal Seat Revenue for different cabin capacities
Capacities Premium Economy
1 790.22 574.06
2 781.80 565.18
. . .
5 715.48 524.07
6 673.08 504.81
7 618.70 482.59
8 600.00 457.48
9 600.00 429.69
10 600.00 400.00
11 600.00 400.00
. . .
18 464.73 399.10
19 436.20 386.92
20 406.58 373.86
. . .
Table 3.4. Example for “Shared nesting EMSRc bidprice control” (0 seat shared)
Cabin Class Avg. fare Mean demand Std. dev. Protection Modified BL
Premium
F $ 800 10 4 7 20
U $ 600 12 8 12 13
Economy
Y $600 13 7 10 10
M $ 400 15 9 22 0
B $ 350 22 10 51 0
L $ 200 27 9 80 0
Z $ 149 34 13 120 0
Q $ 99 42 11 - 0
and 10 seats remaining respectively in the premium and economy cabins. We can see
that the EMSR for the 20th premium cabin unit is is greater than the EMSR for the
11th economy cabin seat. This implies that the expected revenue from premium cabin
passengers for the last seat available in the premium cabin is greater than the expected
revenue from an additional unit in the economy cabin. Therefore, in this case, we decide
not to share any premium seats. Applying the EMSR heuristic yields the booking limits
presented in Table 3.4.
We now look at the hypothetical case where there are 20 and 5 units remaining
respectively in the premium and economy cabins. Here, we can see that the ESMR for
the 6th economy cabin seat ($504.81) is greater than the EMSR for the 20th premium
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Table 3.5. Example for “Shared nesting EMSRc bidprice control” (2 seats shared)
Cabin Class Avg. fare Mean demand Std. dev. Protection Modified BL
Premium
F $ 800 10 4 7 20
U $ 600 12 8 12 13
Economy
Y $600 13 7 10 7
M $ 400 15 9 22 0
B $ 350 22 10 51 0
L $ 200 27 9 80 0
Z $ 149 34 13 120 0
Q $ 99 42 11 - 0
cabin seat ($406.58). This implies that the expected revenue from premium cabin
passengers for the last seat available in the premium cabin is smaller than the expected
revenue from an additional seat in the economy cabin, and we decide to share the
last premium seat with economy passengers. We then compare the EMSR of the 7th
economy cabin seat ($482.59) and we can see that it is also greater than the EMSR for
the 19th premium cabin seat ($436.20). Therefore, we decide to also share the second to
last seat in the premium cabin with economy passengers. Using the same logic, we can
see that it does not make sense to share a third premium seat with economy passengers.
We conclude that the airline should share two seats with economy passengers. Finally,
we apply the EMSRb heuristic independently in each cabin which yields the booking
limits presented in Table 3.5.
 3.2.2 Multiple cabin DP heuristic
The last heuristic that we developed in collaboration with the PODS MIT consortium
member airlines is based on the Lautenbacher-Stidham algorithm presented in Chap-
ter 2. The idea behind the heuristic is to decompose the large multiple cabin problem
into smaller separate cabin problems and use the dynamic programming solution of
these smaller problems depending on the number of seats remaining in each cabin.
More specifically, we apply the separate cabin Lautenbacher-Stidham algorithm to
three different single-leg revenue management problems.
1. Premium pax
Premium classes’ demand using premium cabin capacity
2. Economy pax
Economy classes’ demand using economy cabin capacity
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Figure 3.2. Three different separate cabin DP problems
3. All pax
All classes’ demand using total capacity
We then compare the different booking requests with the bidprice of the different
solution depending on the capacity remaining. Specifically, when there are seats remain-
ing in the economy cabins, premium booking requests are compared to the “Premium
pax” bidprice and economy booking requests are compared to the “Economy pax” bid-
price. When there are no seats left in the economy cabin, all booking requests are
compared to the “All pax” bidprice.
 3.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we presented the different algorithms we developed in collaboration with
MIT PODS consortium airline members. We presented a dynamic programming for-
mulation for the multiple cabin problem that extends the separate cabin Lautenbacher-
Stidham dynamic programming formulation, as well as an extension to the Walczak for-
mulation for the multiple cabin dynamic programming formulation. We also presented
different EMSR-based heuristics and a dynamic programming decomposition heuristic.
These heuristics can be used to control capacity in a multiple cabin environment. More
precisely, we saw three different ways that an airline can calculate the number of units
to be shared in a shared nesting scheme: “Shared Nesting Full EMSR,” “Shared Nesting
Economy EMSR,” and “Shared nesting EMSRc bidprice control.” Finally, we presented
a dynamic programming decomposition that uses the solution from smaller problems
at different times to control capacity in the multiple cabin environment. In the next
chapter, we will compare the performance of these different approaches in two different
simulation environments using the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator.
Chapter 4
Simulation and Results
IN this chapter, we compare the performance of the different algorithms presented inChapter 3 based on simulation results in a competitive environment. More specifi-
cally, we explain differences in revenue and load factor performance by analyzing class
closure rates and fare class mix, and test the sensitivity of these results to different
demand levels.
In this chapter, we introduce the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS),
we explicitly define the performance metrics of interest, and compare the performance
of the different algorithms in the realistic passenger choice simulation environment of
PODS.
 4.1 Simulator description
In this subsection, we describe the simulation tool used in this thesis, the Passenger
Origin-Destination Simulator, which was created by Hopperstad at Boeing in the 1990s.
PODS simulates hypothetical airlines competing for virtual demand in a virtual
network. Figure 4.1 presents its architecture. It is divided in two parts: (1) the Passen-
ger Choice Model, and (2) the Revenue Management System. In the first part, virtual
passengers are created with multiple characteristics such as a preferred schedule, a
maximum willingness-to-pay, and different sensitivity to fare class constraints. In the
second part, the airlines’ logic is defined. Airlines in PODS manage their capacity like
real airlines in the industry by forecasting future demand based on recorded historical
bookings, and can choose from an array of revenue management methods to make their
seat availability decisions.
We limit our description to a relatively high level since PODS has been extensively
described in previous work. We refer readers interested in implementation details to
Carrier’s Master’s thesis [8].
41
Figure 4.1. PODS Architecture representation [4]
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 4.1.1 Passenger Choice Model
The Passenger Choice Model generates virtual passengers with a need for transportation
between the different cities in the network. The simulator generates two different pas-
senger types, business and leisure passengers. The generation process for both passenger
types is identical, the only difference being the value of the different input parameters.
Figure 4.2 shows typical passenger arrival curves for the different passenger types. As
we can see, business passengers arrive, on average, later in the booking process when
compared to leisure passengers. There are three main characteristics that are defined
for each passenger:
Figure 4.2. Passenger arrival curves
1. Willingness-to-pay
Passengers are randomly assigned a maximum out-of-pocket willingness-to-pay.
As one would expect, business passengers have, on average, a higher maximum
willingness-to-pay than leisure passengers.
2. Schedule preference
Based on the Time Of Day Demand curves [10], passengers are assigned a preferred
traveling time window; they are then assigned a rescheduling cost. Passengers pre-
fer itineraries that are within their preferred time window and incur a rescheduling
cost if their selection option is outside their preferred window. As one would ex-
pect, business passengers are generally more sensitive to schedule changes than
leisure passengers.
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3. Restriction sensitivity
Passengers are randomly assigned a sensitivity level to the different restrictions
applied by the airlines to fare classes. As explained in Chapter 1, examples of
restrictions are, among others, minimum stay at destination, change fee, and cancel
fee. The restrictions applied to the different fare classes force passengers to book
in higher fare classes. Another restriction introduced in PODS is the “Economy
cabin” restriction. It represents the disadvantage of not having a confirmed seat
in the premium cabin. As expected, business passengers are, on average, more
sensitive to restrictions than leisure passengers.
As shown on Figure 4.1 after defining passenger characteristics, the passenger choice
set is defined. As its name indicates, the passenger choice set is the subset of fare classes
from which a given passenger makes its final choice. It is created by eliminating fare
classes that have a fare greater than the passenger’s maximum willingness-to-pay from
the set of classes made available by the airline. It is worth noting that “no-go” is an
option for passengers with a WTP lower than the lowest fare class in the set of classes
made available by the airline.
At the last step in the Passenger Choice Model, passengers select the option from
the passenger choice set that minimizes their total cost, where total cost is defined as the
sum of the fare and the costs associated with rescheduling and the cost of restrictions.
The passenger’s final choice is then recorded as a booking by the airline’s revenue
management system.
 4.1.2 Revenue Management System
In this subsection, we describe the Revenue Management System. The Revenue Man-
agement System is the airline side of the simulation and does not have any knowledge
of the underlying parameters of the Passenger Decision Model. The function of the
Revenue Management System is to maximize revenues assuming a given flight schedule
and fixed capacity. There are three main components of the Revenue Management
System:
1. Historical Booking Database
Like in the real airline industry, airlines in PODS record historical booking data.
The observed booking history information stored in the Historical Booking Database
is the only historical information available to the airlines to forecast future demand
and make their seat allocation decision.
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2. Forecaster
Using historical booking data and accepted bookings up to the current reoptimiza-
tion time, airlines forecast bookings-to-come in two steps: (1) Detruncation, and
(2) using different statistical methods (e.g. exponential smoothing).
Detruncation is the process needed to convert observed bookings to an estimate
of true or unconstrained demand. Indeed, airlines have no way of knowing real
demand for a given class on a specific itinerary, and one classic way to estimate
it is to use the Boeing Spill model [9]. Once the airline has an estimate for the
unconstrained demand for a past flight, it can use statistical methods to forecast
demand for future flights.
3. RM Seat Allocation Optimizer
Given forecasted bookings-to-come, airlines use different optimization methods
such as the ones presented in Chapter 3.
The RM seat allocation optimizer keeps track of the number of seats remaining and
decides, based on a specified revenue management algorithm, which fare classes
are available at any given time. The set of available classes is passed to passengers
so that they can define their own “passenger choice set”. As described earlier, the
passenger choice set is then used in the Passenger Choice Model.
PODS represents the state of the art in terms of realistic simulation environment
for airline revenue management and is constantly evolving based on the inputs from the
PODS consortium airline members. Now that we have a better understanding of how
the simulator works, we define the performance indicators that we use to evaluate the
performance of the different methods presented in Chapter 3.
 4.2 Performance indicators
Before comparing the different methods, we need to define the different performance
metrics that we use to evaluate their the performance.
• Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) is a measure of the total capacity used by pas-
sengers. It is computed by summing over all the flight-legs operated by an airline
the product of the number of passengers flying to the distance flown.
46 CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
• Available Seat Miles (ASM) is a measure of the total capacity offered by a given
airline. It is computed by summing over all the flight-legs operated by an airline
the product of the number of seats to the distance flown.
• Revenue is the total amount of money received by the airline. It is calculated by
summing the product of the number of confirmed bookings by the fare in each
class across all itineraries. Revenue is generally the first metric we examine since,
in revenue management, the objective is to maximize revenues.
• Load factor is a measure of utilization of capacity. It is the ratio of used capacity to
the amount of available capacity. For a specific leg, it is calculated by dividing the
total number of passengers sitting on the plane at departure by the total number
of seats on the plane, whereas at the network level, it is calculated by dividing
the total number of RPM with the total number of ASM. In this thesis, we look
at total load factor, which is computed for the entire capacity, and at cabin load
factor, which is computed for each cabin separately.
Load factor is a critical variable in revenue management. Indeed, one of the vari-
able directly influencing revenue is the total number of passengers flying. However,
high load factor does not necessarily lead to high revenues. Indeed, one can think
of a case where a flight is filled with many low fare class passengers.
• Yield is the average revenue generated by a passenger flying one mile. It is calcu-
lated by dividing total revenue by total RPM.
Yield is the other critical variable in revenue management. Because of the law
of supply and demand, high yield is generally associated with lower load factor.
Therefore, one can see that there exists a trade-off between yield and load factor
when maximizing revenues.
• Fare class mix is a measure of the booking spread across the different fare classes.
One can observe the relative strengths and weaknesses of different methods by
comparing fare class mix.
• Closure rate is a measure of availability of the different fare classes. Airline Rev-
enue Management analysts can use closure rates to see what percentage of flights
had a specific class available at a given time.
We will use these different metrics to compare the relative performance of the meth-
ods, and provide some insights on the practical implications of the results.
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Table 4.1. Single market fare structure
Cabin Class Fare AP R1 R2 R3
Premium
1 $ 779 0 NO NO NO
2 $ 702 3 NO YES NO
Economy
3 $ 624 0 NO NO NO
4 $ 440 3 NO YES NO
5 $ 309 7 NO YES YES
6 $ 208 10 YES YES YES
7 $ 171 14 YES YES YES
8 $ 135 14 YES YES YES
 4.3 Results
In this section, we compare the performance of different seat allocation methods. We
first present the general characteristics of the simulations, we then analyze each method
using the performance metrics defined previously and test the sensitivity of the results
to different demand levels.
 4.3.1 Network and fare structure
We use two distinct network and fare structures to compare the different algorithms.
The first network is a single market case with two airlines offering a single flight each in
which we can test computationally intensive methods. The second network is a realistic
network with four airlines competing in multiple markets in which we can better assess
the practical performance of the different algorithms.
Single market
First, we have a single market competitive network with two airlines offering one flight
each in the market. The fare structure in this market is presented in Table 4.1. It
shows the array of different classes offered with their respective fare, Advance Purchase
requirement (AP), and which of the three product restrictions apply. We note that R1
is the most restrictive of all three restrictions and that R3 is more restrictive than R2.
It is important to remember that all economy classes have the additional “Economy
cabin” disutility restriction to model the decision process with regards to the different
cabins. By more restrictive, we mean that the associated contribution to the total cost
used at the passenger decision step in the Passenger Choice Model is higher then the
one associated with other restrictions.
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Table 4.2. Realistic network restricted fare structure
Cabin Class avg. Fare AP R1 R2 R3
Premium
1 $ 1666 0 NO NO NO
2 $ 1500 0 NO YES NO
3 $ 1140 7 YES YES NO
4 $ 801 14 YES YES YES
Economy
5 $ 1333 0 NO NO NO
6 $ 920 3 NO YES NO
7 $ 725 7 NO YES YES
8 $ 602 10 YES YES YES
9 $ 504 14 YES YES YES
10 $ 416 14 YES YES YES
Table 4.3. Realistic network semi-restricted fare structure
Cabin Class avg. Fare AP R1 R2 R3
Premium
1 $ 683 0 NO NO NO
2 $ 594 0 NO YES NO
3 $ 446 7 NO YES NO
4 $ 343 14 NO YES YES
Economy
5 $ 506 0 NO NO NO
6 $ 364 0 NO YES NO
7 $ 280 7 NO YES YES
8 $ 223 7 NO YES YES
9 $ 183 14 NO YES YES
10 $ 153 14 NO YES YES
This single market case will be used to assess the performance of the multiple cabin
dynamic programming formulation. We compare the dynamic programming methods
to the base case and to the “Multiple cabin DP heuristic.” Indeed, since the dynamic
programming formulations are computationally intensive, we can only test them in a
relatively small network.
Realistic network
The second scenario is a more realistic network where four airlines compete in 572
markets. These markets are divided in two market types: (1) higher value restricted
markets, and (2) lower value semi-restricted markets. There are two different market
types in order to simulate the market diversity observed in the industry.
The fare structures for both markets are presented in table 4.2 and 4.3. The re-
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Table 4.4. Distinct EMSR results in single market scenario at low demand
AL ASM RPM LF Yield Rev
1 166940 126028 75.5 0.2440 30749
2 166940 125355 75.1 0.2469 30945
Table 4.5. Distinct EMSR results in single market scenario at medium demand
AL ASM RPM LF Yield Rev
1 166940 138091 82.7 0.2523 34840
2 166940 136580 81.8 0.2596 35458
stricted fare structure is used in 276 markets while the semi-restricted fare structure is
used in the remaining 296 markets. We can see that this network has more classes than
the single market case, and that the average fare for the lowest classes in the premium
cabin is lower than the average fare for top classes in the economy cabin. These differ-
ences make this network more realistic and we will use it to compare the performance of
the different heuristics. It is important to remember that all economy classes have the
additional “Economy cabin” disutility restriction to model the decision process with
regards to the different cabins.
 4.3.2 Base case scenarios
In this section, we define base case scenarios at different demand levels in each network.
Upgrades are not allowed in the base cases and every airline uses the EMSR heuristic
independently in both cabins.
Passengers have the flexibility to choose a seat in both cabins depending on their
inherent characteristics. That said, passengers selecting a premium cabin fare class
have a confirmed seat in the premium cabin and passengers selecting an economy cabin
fare class have a confirmed seat in the economy cabin and it is impossible for them to
be upgraded to a seat in the premium cabin.
Single market
For the single market case, tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 show ASM, RPM, total load factor,
yield, and revenue for the two airlines in the market at a low, medium and high demand
respectively.
The results presented here are sample level averages over five simulation trials of
600 samples where each sample simulates the entire booking process for all flights in the
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Table 4.6. Distinct EMSR results in single market scenario at high demand
AL ASM RPM LF Yield Rev
1 166940 143464 85.9 0.2610 37437
2 166940 141796 84.9 0.2689 38131
Table 4.7. Distinct EMSR fare class mix in single market scenario at low demand
Class AL 1 AL 2
1 8.4 8.4
2 0.9 1.0
Premium total 9.3 9.4
3 1.5 1.7
4 15.3 15.8
5 10.5 10.8
6 2.6 2.8
7 1.0 1.1
8 88.0 86.2
Economy total 119.0 118.3
Grand total 128.3 127.7
network. In other words, it is the average flight revenue performance of each airline. We
can see that both airlines have the exact same number of ASMs at all demand levels.
This is due to the fact that they both offer a single 982-mile flight with two cabins,
economy and premium, having 150 and 20 seats respectively. Both airlines are using
the exact same forecasting and revenue management method, and the fact that Airline
2 has a slight revenue advantage over Airline 1 at all demand levels is due to random
variation in the simulation. It is interesting to note the trade-off between load factor
and yield. Indeed, although Airline 2’s load factor is 0.9 percentage point higher than
Airline 1’s, which could be interpreted as advantageous for Airline 1 by an untrained
analyst, Airline 2’s yield is higher which explains why Airline 2’s revenues are higher
than Airline 1’s.
Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 show the average number of bookings in each class over
the different trials and the different samples at three different demand levels. We can
see that the large majority of bookings observed are Class 8 bookings and that Class
1 is the fare class for which we observe the most bookings in the premium cabin. We
can also see that Class 8 bookings represent a smaller fraction of bookings as demand
increases. This indicated that the revenue management system is able to select the most
valuable passengers and reject lower fare class when demand increases. Consistent with
Table 4.8. Distinct EMSR fare class mix in single market scenario at medium demand
Class AL 1 AL 2
1 10.1 9.9
2 1.3 1.2
Premium total 11.4 11.1
3 1.4 1.8
4 17.1 18.8
5 13.4 14.3
6 4.1 5.2
7 2.8 3.6
8 90.5 84.3
Economy total 129.3 127.95
Grand total 140.6 139.1
Table 4.9. Distinct EMSR fare class mix in single market scenario at high demand
Class AL 1 AL 2
1 10.8 10.6
2 1.4 1.3
Premium total 12.1 12.0
3 1.4 1.8
4 18.8 20.7
5 15.9 17.0
6 7.2 8.5
7 7.3 7.7
8 83.3 76.8
Economy total 134.0 132.4
Grand total 146.1 144.4
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results in tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, Airline 1 accepted more bookings than Airline 2, but
the mix is such that the average fare per booking or, equivalently, the yield is higher
for Airline 2. It is also interesting to note that, on average, a little over 8 seats out of
the 20 available premium seats at medium demand are left empty. Successful multiple
cabin optimization methods will accept additional economy bookings and allow these
passengers to use available premium cabin capacity.
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Figure 4.3. Airline 1 class closure rates in single market scenario at low demand
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show Airline 1’s percentage of samples for which the spec-
ified class is closed as a function of time before departure, which we refer to as closure
rates. The booking horizon is divided in sixteen “time frames” and departure is at the
end of time frame 16. As one would expect, lower classes close earlier than in the book-
ing process than higher classes, and closure rates are generally increasing as demand is
increasing.
Realistic network
Tables 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12 show average sample results over 2 trials of 600 samples. One
can see by comparing ASMs that this scenario is much bigger than the single market
scenario. In this network, Airline 1 is the dominant carrier in terms of ASMs, RPMs,
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Figure 4.4. Airline 1 class closure rates in single market scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.5. Airline 1 class closure rates in single market scenario at high demand
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Table 4.10. Distinct EMSR results in realistic network scenario at low demand
AL ASM RPM LF Yield Rev
1 28,743,562 20,821,930 72.4 0.1585 3,301,295
2 23,584,496 17,401,240 73.8 0.1500 2,609,477
3 10,311,962 7,115,968 69.0 0.1485 1,056,680
4 17,870,366 12,413,867 69.5 0.1540 1,911,148
Table 4.11. Distinct EMSR results in realistic network scenario at medium demand
AL ASM RPM LF Yield Rev
1 28,743,562 22,928,808 79.8 0.1590 3,645,111
2 23,584,496 19,059,300 80.8 0.1500 2,859,374
3 10,311,962 7,839,079 76.0 0.1485 1,163,760
4 17,870,366 13,849,365 77.5 0.1534 2,123,841
yield and revenues. Airlines 1, 2 and 4 are providing service in a mix of restricted
and semi-restricted markets. Airline 3 has less capacity than other airlines, as exposed
by its significantly smaller number of ASMs, and is offering service in semi-restricted
markets only. We can see that total load factor is increasing as demand increases.
Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 show the average number of bookings per sample on the
entire network for each class and for each airline at different demand levels. We can
see that the majority of bookings are observed in Class 10. This is due to the fact that
Class 10 has the lowest fare in all markets and that the restrictions in place are such
that a majority of the bookings are observed in this class. For similar reasons, Class 3
is the fare class for which we observe the most bookings in the premium cabin.
Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 show Airline 1’s rate across samples and trials of flights for
which the specified class is closed as a function of time in the booking process, which
we refer to as closure rates. We can see that high class closure rates are lower than
low class closure rate in both cabins and that closure rates increase for all classes when
demand increases.
In this subsection, we presented the base line performance at different demand levels
Table 4.12. Distinct EMSR results in realistic network scenario at high demand
AL ASM RPM LF Yield Rev
1 28,743,562 24,722,054 86.0 0.1600 3,954,362
2 23,584,496 20,372,184 86.4 0.1516 3,089,123
3 10,311,962 8,497,807 82.4 0.1496 1,271,283
4 17,870,366 15,113,955 84.6 0.1538 2,324,899
Table 4.13. Distinct EMSR fare class mix in realistic network scenario at low demand
Class AL 1 AL 2 AL 3 AL 4
1 323.03 245.66 46.86 156.98
2 49.82 39.95 14.57 36.34
3 548.28 526.65 547.89 454.34
4 36.84 71.55 34.36 34.95
Premium total 957.97 883.81 643.68 682.61
5 534.93 429.09 338.59 302.87
6 1076.15 980.85 312.15 576.83
7 327.94 261.78 38.84 158.04
8 139.1 150.18 115.42 119.07
9 11.09 7.95 7.72 3.78
10 4954.94 4478.53 3312.53 3698.96
Economy total 7044.15 6308.38 4125.25 4859.55
Grand total 8002.12 7192.19 4768.93 5542.16
Table 4.14. Distinct EMSR fare class mix in realistic network scenario at medium demand
Class AL 1 AL 2 AL 3 AL 4
1 346.97 257.93 46.24 168.66
2 54.56 40.64 13.5 38.63
3 564.08 552.08 572.2 474.17
4 35.23 69.7 34.32 34.84
Premium total 1000.84 920.35 666.26 716.3
5 624.05 496.53 400.63 355.76
6 1218.24 1107.85 365.96 652.31
7 379.89 300.65 43.32 182.27
8 157.02 170.48 138.33 135.48
9 58.17 49 38.33 35.94
10 5421.71 4865.65 3585.75 4088.21
Economy total 7859.08 6990.16 4572.32 5449.97
Grand total 8859.92 7910.51 5238.58 6166.27
Table 4.15. Distinct EMSR fare class mix in realistic network scenario at high demand
Class AL 1 AL 2 AL 3 AL 4
1 373.27 273.28 45.08 183.34
2 60.27 44.41 13.19 42.24
3 576.23 568.94 598.08 488.75
4 35.84 67.74 35.27 34.43
Premium total 1045.61 954.37 691.62 748.76
5 689.9 558.89 468.28 394.66
6 1374.02 1250.69 430.77 740.39
7 446.28 353.42 52.5 216.9
8 188.5 212.29 185.58 168.28
9 213.5 183.93 133.25 136.83
10 5652.62 5019.01 3707.52 4333.51
Economy total 8564.82 7578.23 4977.9 5990.57
Grand total 9610.43 8532.6 5669.52 6739.33
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Figure 4.6. Airline 1 class closure rates in realistic network scenario at low demand
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Figure 4.7. Airline 1 class closure rates in realistic network scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.8. Airline 1 class closure rates in realistic network scenario at high demand
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in the two scenarios of interest. We saw that, in the single market case, both airlines
perform very similarly whereas there are clear differences between the airlines in the
realistic network scenario.
 4.3.3 Performance evaluation
In this subsection, we compare the relative effect on Airline 1’s performance of different
multiple cabin optimization methods. For each method, we focus on relative revenue
performance, load factor changes, fare class mix variation, and closure rates differences;
we test the sensitivity of the results to different demand levels; and we also discuss the
practical implications of the results.
Single market
We first compare all algorithms presented in Chapter 3 in the single market case. We
are interested in the competitive implication of the methods, so we test the variation
when only Airline 1 uses the different optimization methods while Airline 2 uses the
EMSR heuristic independently in each cabin (Distinct EMSR).
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Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 show the revenue percentage change for both airlines when
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Airline 1 is using the specified method. It is important to note that “Distinct LDP”
and “Distinct LDP with variance” are not multiple cabin optimization methods. These
methods were presented in Chapter 2 and they were introduced in the analysis to allow
us to isolate the effects of multiple cabin optimization from dynamic programming. We
can see that most of the multiple cabin optimization methods lead to a revenue decrease
for Airline 1. In fact, only the “Multiple cabin DP heuristic” leads to a 1% increase in
the low and medium demand levels and to a 0.5% increase in the high demand case. We
can see, by comparing “Multiple cabin DP” with “Multiple cabin DP with Variance”
that accounting for variance improves the performance of multiple cabin optimization.
Finally, in the single market case, none of the EMSR-based multiple cabin heuristics
improve revenues over the distinct cabin base case.
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Figure 4.12. Load factors in single market scenario at low demand
Figures 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 show total load factor changes for both airlines when
Airline 1 is using different methods. We observe that allowing additional economy book-
ings to use available premium capacity by using a multiple cabin optimization method
leads to a total load factor increase for Airline 1. Indeed, comparing EMSR-based
heuristics with the “Distinct EMSR” base case, and the Multiple cabin DP methods
with their respective distinct case, we can see that total load factor increases when
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using a multiple cabin optimization method.
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Figure 4.15. Cabin load factors in single market scenario at low demand
Figures 4.15, 4.16, and 4.17 show Airline 1’s cabin load factor when Airline 1 uses the
specified revenue management algorithm at different demand levels. Because multiple
cabin methods allow additional economy booking requests to use available premium
capacity, we observe that all multiple cabin methods lead to an increase in premium
cabin load factor and that the economy cabin load factor is not changing significantly
when compared to the base case scenario.
Figures 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 show the average number of bookings per sample in each
class for Airline 1 with exact numbers shown for classes 1 and 8. We note that most
multiple cabin methods lead to an increase in Class 8 bookings and in a decrease in
Class 1 bookings. This means that there is a trade-off between the additional economy
bookings accepted by the airline and displaced high value premium bookings. The
difference in revenue performance is explained by two things. First, the magnitude of
the displacement effect of premium passengers by economy passengers and, second, the
average fare paid by additional economy cabin bookings. Figures 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11
show that “Multiple cabin DP heuristic” is the only multiple cabin optimization method
that leads to a revenue increase. Looking at the fare class mix, we can see that the
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Figure 4.16. Cabin load factors in single market scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.17. Cabin load factors in single market scenario at high demand
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Figure 4.18. Fare class mix in single market scenario at low demand
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Figure 4.20. Fare class mix in single market scenario at high demand
“Multiple cabin DP heuristic” is the only one for which the number of Class 8 bookings
increase over its relevant distinct case (Distinct LDP). Furthermore, we can see that
the number of Class 3 bookings increases over the distinct case. This indicates that the
“Multiple cabin DP heuristic” forces additional economy bookings into more valuable
economy classes, which leads to a revenue increase.
Figures 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23 show the average percentage of samples for which a spec-
ified class is closed as a function of time in the booking process for different optimization
methods, which we refer to as closure rates. First, we observe that, in general, closure
rates have very similar patterns from one method to the other and that there are a few
methods that have significantly different closure rates. We focus on “Multiple cabin
DP with variance” at medium demand, and we can see from figure 4.22(D) that closure
rates for the lowest economy cabin fare class are relatively high early in the booking
process, decrease midway to a level below the average closure rates of other methods
and finally closes late in the booking process. We can also see from figure 4.22(A) and
figure 4.22(B) that closure rates for premium classes are slightly higher early in the
booking process, and generally flatter later in the booking process. The overall trend
is not affected by different demand levels.
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Figure 4.21. Closure rates in single market scenario at low demand
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Figure 4.22. Closure rates in single market scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.23. Closure rates in single market scenario at high demand
The relatively poor performance of most of the multiple cabin optimization methods
presented in this section is due to the fact that revenues gained from additional econ-
omy bookings are smaller than revenues lost from displaced premium passengers. The
“Multiple cabin DP heuristic” leads to a revenue increase because additional economy
bookings are in higher classes. Benefits from multiple cabin optimization methods are
driven by (1) the number of additional bookings, (2) the average fare paid by these
extra economy passengers, (3) the number of displaced premium passengers, and (4)
the average fare paid by displaced premium cabin passengers. In the single market case,
the vast majority of premium bookings are Class 1 bookings; this implies that most of
the displaced premium passengers are high-value Class 1 passengers. Since all premium
fares are higher than economy fares, additional economy passengers have to outnumber
displaced premium passengers. Since the number of extra economy bookings is limited
by the available capacity in premium, only methods that force extra economy bookings
in higher classes lead to a revenue increase. Another interesting observation, as we
noted when analyzing Figure 4.13, is that multiple cabin optimization methods all lead
to a total load factor increase. This is viewed as highly positive by airline management
teams since it sends the signal that their company is more efficient and better uses its
capacity. Finally, the multiple cabin results were not significantly different from one
demand level from the other.
68 CHAPTER 4. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
When dynamic programming methods were introduced in chapters 2 and 3 we pre-
sented them as being well suited for the revenue management problem. Therefore, it
is surprising that “Multiple cabin DP” and “Multiple cabin DP with variance” do not
perform better than the “Multiple cabin DP heuristic.” This is due to the mismatch
between the underlying assumptions of multiple cabin dynamic programming and the
reality of the booking and passenger choice process. We identified the variance assump-
tion implied by the Poisson arrival process as the reason why “Multiple cabin DP”
underperforms compared to the base case scenario. As exposed by Diwan [11], this
variance assumption causes the algorithm to be overconfident regarding late high-WTP
booking requests, which in turn leads to decreasing closure rates during the booking
process as shown in figures 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23. Consequently, high-WTP passengers
arriving later in the booking process are able to book in lower classes; this effect ex-
plains the change in fare class mix and the reduction in revenues for “Multiple cabin
DP.”
“Multiple cabin DP with Variance” addresses the variance issue, but still under-
performs compared to the base case scenario and compared to the “Multiple cabin DP
heuristic.” It is also interesting to note that “Multiple cabin DP with variance” also
suffers from the declining closure rates effect as shown on figures 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23.
This indicates that the variance assumption is not the only reason explaining dynamic
programming methods’ underperformance. Indeed, the dynamic programming formu-
lations also assume that the airline can reoptimize and change the bidprice value after
every single booking. We saw in Chapter 1 that airlines in practice reoptimize at a
relatively small number of times throughout the booking process; this causes dynamic
programming to respond more slowly to changes in the booking behavior and leads to
the observed revenue performance and closure rate patterns.
Also, dynamic programming methods, like the other multiple cabin algorithms
tested, do not take competitive interactions or passenger choice into consideration.
In other words, they do not take into account competitors’ strategy and they assume
that demand is independent between the different fare classes. Our results suggest
that the dynamic programming methods tested are more sensitive to the assumption
misalignment than the heuristics we developed.
Realistic network
We now look at the more realistic network scenario. Since this is a more complex and
bigger scenario, it is not practical to run “Multiple cabin DP” and “Multiple cabin DP
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with variance”. Therefore, we compare the performance of different heuristics.
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Figure 4.24. Relative revenue change over base case in realistic network scenario at low demand
Figures 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26 show relative revenue change for all four airlines when
Airline 1 uses different optimization methods. We can see that the “Multiple cabin DP
heuristic” leads to a 0.6%, 1.2%, and 2.4% increase in revenues at low, medium, and
high demand, respectively. This result is in line with what we observed in the single
market scenario. As in the single market case, most of the EMSR-based heuristics lead
to a revenue decrease. However, we can see that “Shared Nesting Full EMSR” leads to
a revenue increase for Airline 1 ranging from 0.1% to 0.4% over the base case depending
on the demand level.
Figures 4.27, 4.28, and 4.29 show total load factors for all four airlines when Airline
1 is using different optimization methods. We can see that total load factor changes are
smaller in magnitude compared to the single market case. It is important to note that
total load factor increases from the base case when using all multiple cabin heuristics
apart from “Shared Nesting Full EMSR.”
Figures 4.30, 4.31, and 4.32 show Airline 1’s cabin load factors when it is using
the specified revenue management method. We observe a similar pattern to the one
observed in the single market scenario, with an increase in premium cabin load factor
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Figure 4.25. Relative revenue change over base case in realistic network scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.26. Relative revenue change over base case in realistic network scenario at high demand
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Figure 4.27. Load factor in realistic network scenario at low demand
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Figure 4.28. Load factor in realistic network scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.29. Load factor in realistic network scenario at high demand
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Figure 4.30. Cabin load factor in realistic network scenario at low demand
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
Distinct EMSR Shared nesting
Full EMSR
Shared Nesting
Economy EMSR
Shared Nesting
EMSRc bid price
control
Multiple cabin
DP heuristic
Airline 1’s cabin Load factors when Airline 1 uses different 
optimization methods (other airlines use distinct EMSR) in a 
realistic market scenario at medium demand 
Premium
Economy
Figure 4.31. Cabin load factor in realistic network scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.32. Cabin load factor in realistic network scenario at high demand
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and slight variations in economy cabin load factor when using multiple cabin methods.
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Figure 4.33. Fare class mix in realistic network scenario at low demand
Figures 4.33, 4.34, and 4.35 show the average number of bookings across samples
in the different fare classes for multiple optimization methods. We first see that the
vast majority of bookings are observed in Class 10 for all methods. We can also see
that “Shared Nesting Full EMSR” is the only method that has a smaller number of
Class 10 bookings when compared to the base case. It is also important to note that
only “Shared Nesting Full EMSR” and “Multiple cabin DP heuristic” are leading to an
increase in Class 5 (i.e. top economy) bookings.
Figures 4.36, 4.37, and 4.38 show the average percentage of Airline 1 flights for
which the specified class is closed over the simulation samples, known as closure rates,
for the highest and lowest class in both cabin. All the EMSR-based heuristics have
very similar closure rate behavior, but the “Multiple cabin DP heuristic” has the lowest
closure rate for Class 10 midway in the booking process and the lowest Class 5 closure
rate late in the booking process. This explains why this method is able to keep a high
number of Class 10 bookings while accepting more Class 5 bookings late in the booking
process.
The results observed in the realistic network are in line with what was observed
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Figure 4.34. Fare class mix in realistic network scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.35. Fare class mix in realistic network scenario at high demand
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Figure 4.36. Closure rates in realistic network scenario at low demand
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Figure 4.37. Closure rates in realistic network scenario at medium demand
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Figure 4.38. Closure rates in realistic network scenario at high demand
in the single market scenario. Indeed, the multiple cabin optimization methods that
leads to a revenue increase forces additional economy bookings in top economy classes.
Interestingly, “Shared Nesting Full EMSR” leads to a total load factor decrease in this
scenario. This is a counterintuitive result since one would expect that allowing for
upgrades would systematically lead to a total load factor increase. Although the pre-
mium cabin load factor increases, the decrease in total load factor for “Shared Nesting
Full EMSR” is driven by a decrease in economy cabin load factor due to an increase
in the protection levels against low economy classes. Higher protection levels against
low economy classes means that passengers are forced to book in high economy classes
which, in turn, increases the forecasted demand for these high economy classes, which
further increases the protection levels against low economy classes. In fact, this effect
is the exact opposite of the “spiral down” effect in revenue management. The fact that
we observe a total load factor decrease for this method is an indication that this “spiral
up” effect is stronger than the effect of adding available seats in the economy cabin.
We also note that since the fare of the top economy classes are higher than the fare
for low premium classes, some of the displaced premium passengers are replaced by more
valuable economy passengers. Therefore, there is a greater potential for revenue increase
for multiple cabin optimization methods. This realistic network scenario also highlights
the competitive interactions. Indeed, we can see that airlines 2, 3, and 4 experience a
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revenue decrease when Airline 1 experiences a revenue increase and vice versa. This
indicates that competitors are affected by Airline 1’s decision and they accept premium
passengers rejected by Airline 1, while Airline 1 takes economy passengers from its
competitors. Finally, as in the single market scenario, multiple cabin optimization
performance was not significantly affected by the change in demand levels.
 4.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we compared the relative performance of the different multiple cabin
optimization methods explained in Chapter 3. We presented the Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator used to test the algorithms. Finally, we discussed the perfor-
mance of the different optimization methods in two different simulation scenarios.
We saw that multiple cabin optimization can lead to a revenue increase. We ob-
served that the “Multiple cabin DP heuristic” leads to an increase in revenues ranging
from 0.5% to 2.5% depending on the network and the demand level. “Shared nesting
Full EMSR” leads to a revenue increase ranging from 0.1% at low demand to 0.4% at
high demand in the realistic network scenario. Other methods led to a revenue de-
crease ranging from 9.6% for “Shared nesting Economy EMSR” at high demand in the
single market scenario to 0.05% for “Shared nesting EMSRc bid price control” at low
demand in the realistic network scenario. The performance of the different optimiza-
tion methods is explained by the trade-off between revenues gained from additional
economy cabin bookings and revenues lost from rejected premium cabin bookings, and
successful multiple cabin methods were all increasing the gain from additional economy
cabin bookings by forcing passengers to sell up to top economy classes.
We also discussed the mismatch between the underlying assumptions of the dynamic
programming approaches and the reality of the booking process. Although dynamic
programming is theoretically appealing for the revenue management problem, our re-
sults show that it is not performing as well in a competitive environment as some of
the heuristics we developed. Diwan [11] suggested that dynamic programming under-
performs because of the mismatch between the Poisson variance assumption and the
higher observed variance in the airline industry. This assertion is supported by the
results obtained with “Multiple cabin DP”. Although taking variance into account
improves dynamic programming’s performance as exposed by the “Multiple cabin DP
with Variance” performance, we observe that the “Multiple cabin DP heuristic” still
performs better than “Multiple cabin DP with Variance”. This is due to the fact that
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dynamic programming methods assume that airlines reoptimize and can change the
decision rule after every booking request whereas airlines do not have the ability to
do so in practice. This implies that airlines applying dynamic programming have to
average their bidprices, which reduces the ability of the dynamic programming algo-
rithm to respond to changes in the booking behavior. Also, our results suggests that
dynamic programming methods, “Multiple cabin DP” and “Multiple cabin DP with
Variance”, are less robust to the fact that other underlying assumptions do not match
the competitive reality of the booking and passenger choice process when compared to
the proposed heuristics.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
IN this thesis, we defined the multiple cabin single-leg revenue management problemand compared the performance of different optimization methods and heuristics in a
competitive environment. In this chapter, we review our contribution, summarize our
findings, and discuss future research opportunities.
 5.1 Contribution and findings
The contribution of this work is two fold. First, we developed multiple optimization
methods to solve the multiple cabin problem. We extended existing separate cabin
single-leg dynamic programming formulations to the multiple cabin problem. Further-
more, we developed several heuristics based on existing dynamic programming formula-
tions or on approaches widely used in the industry. Second, we compared and discussed
the performance of the different methods developed using simulation results from the
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS).
The objective of multiple cabin revenue management is to better use the airline’s
capacity by allowing economy bookings to use available premium capacity. One would
think that this can only lead to a revenue increase since airlines allow additional econ-
omy bookings to use available premium capacity. Interestingly, we found that most
methods tested did not lead to a revenue increase when simulated in a competitive
environment with passenger choice. As expected, we observed an increase in premium
cabin load factor with all the methods tested, and an increase in total load factor when
using most of the multiple cabin optimization methods, “Shared nesting Full EMSR” in
the realistic network scenario being the only exception. However, these additional econ-
omy passengers were using the premium capacity, and because of the stochastic nature
of the observed demand, some premium booking requests were rejected. Therefore, in-
stead of a systematic revenue increase driven by additional bookings in economy classes,
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we observed a trade-off between revenue gains from additional economy bookings and
revenue losses from displaced premium passengers.
Only two multiple cabin optimization methods led to a revenue increase over the
base case: “Shared nesting Full EMSR” led to an increase ranging from 0.1% to 0.4% in
the realistic network scenario depending on the demand level, and the “Multiple cabin
DP heuristic” led to increases ranging from 0.5% to 2.4% depending on the demand
level and on the scenario. These methods were successful because they forced additional
economy bookings in top economy classes. Since top economy classes are more valuable
than low economy classes, the revenue benefit from these additional economy bookings
is greater. This effect is in fact more important than the impact of increased load
factor from better capacity usage. This is illustrated by the fact that “Shared nesting
Full EMSR” led to a revenue increase despite a slight total load factor decrease in the
realistic network scenario.
Although theoretically appealing, dynamic programming methods have not per-
formed well compared to some of the heuristics we developed. This is due to existing
differences between the underlying assumptions of the dynamic programming formula-
tions and the characteristics of the booking process faced in practice by the airlines.
More precisely, the combination of at least two effects is leading to the observed result.
First, as shown by Diwan [11], the assumed variance by the Poisson process behind
dynamic programming makes the method overconfident about late high-WTP booking
requests, and the fact that airlines cannot reoptimize after each booking request re-
duces the ability of dynamic programming to correct the bidprice when it realizes that
late high-WTP booking requests do not materialize or when it identifies changes in the
booking behavior. Moreover, our results also suggest that the dynamic programming
methods tested are less robust to underlying assumption mismatch when compared to
the proposed heuristics.
 5.2 Directions for further research
We focused on the multiple-cabin revenue management problem. While providing so-
lutions to this problem, we made some simplifying assumptions. Most importantly,
we focused on the single-leg revenue management problem and ignored the fact that
airlines are offering multiple interdependent flight-legs in a complex network. Future
work should address the network multiple-cabin revenue management problem. In the
single-leg multiple-cabin revenue management problem we are making the simplifying
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assumption that all the demand on a given flight-leg is flying from the flight-leg’s ori-
gin to the flight-leg’s destination. Therefore, future work should take into account the
trade-off between accepting a booking request from a passenger using multiple flight-
legs and a booking request from a passenger using a single flight-leg. There exist
network formulations for the separate cabin revenue management problem. Extending
the existing virtual nesting approach [14] to the multiple cabin problem using one of
the EMSR-based heuristics proposed in this thesis seems to be a reasonable practical
starting point.
Computational time is a major issue with the dynamic programming algorithms
we proposed in this work. Therefore, developing a robust heuristic that reduces com-
putation time while providing a solution of quality can still be explored further. In
this thesis, we proposed many EMSR-based heuristics, and a dynamic programming
decomposition, but future work could incorporate dynamic programming roll-outs as
Bertsekas [6] described in his book. Indeed, using the EMSRb heuristic, a relatively
fast heuristic, to estimate expected future revenue at a given time, one can use dynamic
programming over a reduced number of time slices to improve on the EMSR estimate
and, in theory, find a better solution.
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